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[20C. (2d)

cases heretofore cited, which compels a holding that such
waiver occurs as a matter of law where, as in this case, there
is a sufficient showing that there was no intent to waive the
right or to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in which the
action is commenced, and the defendant has acted in good
faith and with diligence. To blind one's self to the realities
by a slavish adherence to technicalities is not consonant with
justice or the liberal tendencies with respect to rules of procedure and practice. To give the construction to section 396b
contended for by plaintiffs would be unreasonable and out
of line with the rules pertaining to waiver. Furthermore, it
would require a strict and literal, rather than a liberal interpretation of that section.
The right of the defendant to have certain actions tried
in the county of his residence "is an ancient and valuable
right, which has always been safeguarded by statute and is
supported by a long line of judicial decisions. 'The right of
a plaintiff to have an action tried in another county than
that in which the defendant has his residence is exceptional,
ltnd, if the plaintiff would claim such right, he must bring
himself within the terms of the eXCleption.' (Brady v. TimesMirror Co., 106 Cal. 56 [39 Pac. 209].)" (Brown v. Happy
Valley Fruit Growers, 206 Cal. 515, 522 [274 Pac. 977].)
The facts of this case clearly present a situation in which it
should be said that defendant Bowell has not waived that
right as was found by the trial court. His residence being
near the city and county of San Francisco there was no reason for him to insist on a trial in San Mateo County. He did
not at any time consent that the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County should retain the right. to try the action. When his
co-pefendant Dooley demanded a transfer to the Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco, he naturally
a,greed that that court could try the case; it was not equivalent
to his consent that the case be tried in the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs then, without prior notice to
defendants· of their intention. to do so, dismissed the action
as to defendant Dooley. The reason: therefore may reasonably be said to have been to prevent the transfer of the case
from Los Angeles. Defendant Bowell was then placed in a
position, where he had to make his motion for a transfer if
he wished to preserve his right. He acted promptly, a week
after tIre dismissal,aud filed an amended demurrer at the
same tin;te. As far, as ~ppears, the demurrer had not been
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submitted to the court for decision nor ruled upon when he
filed his motion for a transfer. Plaintiffs have sUffered no
prejudice.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J.,Shenk, J:, Curtis, J., and Traynor, J." con~
curred.

[S.F. No. 16529: In Bank. July 23, 1942.J

ALICE SPEOKet al., Respondents, v. PHILIPR. SARVER
et aI., ApP!'lllants ..

..

[1] Automobiles-Actions-Appeal-Oonclusiveness of VerdictOpntributory NegUgence.-!D.an action arising out, of a head,. on collision on a winding highway in. which there was c,6nfiicting testimony as to whether plaintiffs w~' traveling on
their proper side of the roadway ~t a 'slow rate of speed, .an
implied finding of freedom from contributory 'neglig~nce' is
conclusive on appeal. ,
.."
[2] Negligence-InstructIons-Contributory Negligence-:.Presumption.-In a negligence action, an instruction as to the pre. sumption of 'plaitttiff's';freedom from contributory negligence
,: should not be given where histestimon:v disaloses the acts
and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to or at '
.the. time in question, there being in such case, no room for any
pre~umption. '
[~] Id.---Review-,--:a:armless and· Reversible Error-Instructions'.' Contributory Negiigence.-In a negligence action, an instruction as to ~4e presumption of plaintiff's fre~dom from contributory negligencl), erroneously given, is not prejudicial to
" the 'aefeIi.d~nt 'where there is, testimony on both sides on the
question of contri~utory negligence and anipl~evidence to
sustain- the finding of the ahsence of such negligence, where'
the instrUction'itself is qualified by the phrase ·"hi. tbeabsence
of evidence tOithe contrary," and 'where, moreover, the jury'
.', iilfully instruc.ted on the. subject of contributory negligence.
[4] Appeal-Harmless ,and Reversible Error-Oonduct of· Oounsel
--Our!!, by InstrllOtion.-In a negligence action, any miscon-

~*]. ~resumption'as'evidence, nQ~e, 95 A. L. R. 878. See,; also,
1QOa1.Jut.-744; 20 Am. Jur. 170.
' ,
'.'
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 371 (2); '[2] Negli~'
g~n~e, §209; [3] Negligence, § 246; [4] Appeal and Error, §l538;
[5TApp~alandErrbr, ,§ 1592.·
,
.., .
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duct of plaintiffs' counsel in implying that the defendants'
counsel withheld photographs of the scene of the accident
could not be said to have been prejudicial where the jury
were admonished to disregard the statements.
[5] Id.-Harmless and Reversible Error - Evidence - Insurance
Against Loss.-In a negligence action, plaintiff's statement
on the witness stand that the defendant stated he was insured did not constitute prejudicial misconduct where the
statement was made incidentally during testimony as to a
conversation tending to show an admission of fault, and
where it was not made in response to any question attempting
to inject the fact of insurance into the case.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County. Aylett R. Cotton, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for injuries arising out of an automobile collision. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
Francis N. Foley for Appellants.
Norman S. Menifee for Respondents.
CURTIS, J.-Defendants appeal from a jUdgment in favor
of plaintiffs for damages for injuries arising out of an automobile eollision.
The two automobiles involved approached from opposite
directions on a narrow, winding highway and met in a headon collision on a curve in the road. There was no white line
marking the middle of the highway. A bank extended upward
on the east or defendants' side of the road, and there was a
steep slope extending downward on the west or plaintiffs' side
of the road. The plaintiffs testified that the defendants' automobile was on the wrong side of the road and traveling at an
excessive rate of speed immediately preceding the collision,
while plaintiffs' automobile was on the proper side of the
road and traveling at a slow rate of speed. Plaintiff Matthew
Speck, the driver of the car, testified that just prior to the
impact he swerved slightly toward the center of the road to
avoid going over the bank. The tlefendant driver also turned
in and the automobiles came to rest approximately in the center of the road. Philip Sarver, the driver of the defendants'
car, testified that at all times he was driving on the proper
side of the r:oad at a moderate speed, while just before the
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collision plaintiff Speck. was driving on the wrong side of the
road. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs,
a motion for a new trial was made by the defendants and denied by the trial court.
[1] Upon this appeal it is urged that the evidence is insufficient to support the implied finding of the jury ~hat the
plaintiffs were free from negligence. In other words, it is
contended that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is also urged that the court erred
in giving a certain instruction to the jury; and that there
was prejudicial misconduct on the part of plaintiffs' attorney
preventing defendants from having a fair triaL
There is no necessity for a detailed discussion of appellants' first contention. From the brief recital of the facts
herein and from the other evidence disclosed by the record,
it is apparent that the jury was justified in making its implied finding that the plaintiffs were free from contributory
negligence. The evidence is conflicting on this issue and the
jury's implied finding thereon is conclusive on appeal. (Taylor v .. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 Cal. (2d) 594 [110 P. (2d)
1044]; Flores v. Fitzgerald, 204 Cal. 374 [268 Pac. 369];
..~ Smith v. Rothschild, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 273 [39 P. (2d) 464] ;
Wynne v. Wright, 105 Cal. App. 17 [286 Pac. 1057].)
[2] The instruction complained of is as follows: "In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that
the plaintiffs did everything that reasonably prudent pergons would have done under the circumstances for the protection of their safety. The presumption that plaintiffs were
llot guilty of contributory riegligence is, in itself, .a species
of evidence which continues with the said plaintiffs throughout the trial of this action and unless and until overcome by
evidence to the contrary. This presumption in favor of said
plaintiffs must ~revail until and unless it is overCome by satigfactory evidence to the contrary."
'rho rebuttable presumption that a person takes ordinary
care of his own concerns is declared in section 1963(4) of the
Codc of Civil Pro('cduJ'c . .An instruction as to the existence of
this presumption may properly be given to the jury in certain situations. (See Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal. (2d) 360
[94 P. (2d) 590] ; Ellison v. Lang Transportation Co., 12 Cal.
(2d) 355 [84 P. (2d) 510] ; Downing v. Southern Pacific Co.,
15 Cal. App. (2<1) 246 [59 P. (2d) 578].) Such an instruction, however, should not be given where the evidence intro-
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.dw~ed by the plaintiff disdoses the acts and conduct of the
injured party immediately prior to or at the time in question.
(See cases last cited and also Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal. (2d)
294 [65 P;(2d) 65]; Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal.. (2d) 111
[47 P.(2d) 709]; Rogersv. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal.
36 [297 Pac. 884].) In the instant case the plaintiffs testified
.in regard to the events leaditig up to the collision. Plaintiff
Matthew Speck, the driver, explained all of his actions. Under such circumstances there was no room for the presumptionin this case. What was said in Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., supra, is equally applicable here. It is there stated at
page 38: "At the trial of this action plaintiff not only testified
as to the circumstances of the collision between .the car he
was driving and the .autostage of the defendant, but he produced witnesses who gave evidence, both direct and on crossexamination, of his acts and conduct just before and at the
time of the collision. Whether the plaintiff took ordinary
care of his own concerns while operating his car at that particularoccasion was a matter of evidence established by the
plaintiff and wit:riesses called by him in support of his daim
that he did. In the face of this evidence there was no' room
for any presumption. If the evidence on his part showed that
he was negligent, then it cannot be saId that the jury, notwithstanding this evidence, might presume that he was not
negligent~ or that he took ordinary care of his own concerns,
which amounts to the same thing. On the other hand, if this
evidence showed that plaintiff was not negligent in the operation of his car at the time of its collision with defendant's
stage, then that fact was before the jury, not as the result of
any presumption, but in response to testimony of witnesses
testifying in the case. In either event, the jury, in determiningwhether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence, would look
to and be governed by the evidence·before the court, and not
by any presumption." In view of the foregoing, the giving of
the instruction complained of was error.
[3] The question still remains whether the instruction was
prejudicial under all the circumstances of this case. We are
satisfied that it was not. There was considerable testimony
on both sides on the question of contributory negligence, and,
as previously stated, there was ample evidence to support the
jury's implied finding that the plaintiffs were not negligent.
The instruction itself was qualified by the phrase "in the
absence of evidence to the contrary," Under it the jury was

0;"

therefore free to accept the contrary evidence and· to r~turn:
a verdict thereon in favor of the defendants. Contributory
negligence was fully and properly defined by the court,~and
the jury was instructed: "If you find from the evidence that
plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as defined in
this instruction, however slight such contributoIjhegligence
on their part may have been, then you should return your
verdict for the defendants, and each of them." The jury
was further. instructed: "Plaintiffs were at all times· called
upon to exercise ordinary care for their own safety and,if
they failed to do so, and such failure was a proximate. cause
of injury or damage to them, they cannot recover and" your
verdict must be against· them and in favor of defendant's."
The jury was also told: "Whether the parties did, or" did not,
use ordinary care is for you to determine from the facts testified to and, if you condude from the evidence that plain-.
tiffs did not use ordinary care and that their lack of ordinary
care contributed proximately to their .injury or damage then
your verdict must be against the plaintiffs and in favor of
defendants." In consideration of the qualification in the instruction itself and in view of the other instructions quoted
above, the defendants did not stiffer any prejudice by the
giving of the instruction. Under such circumstances the error
is not prejudicial and does not warrant a reversal. [Ca1ifor~
nia Constitution, article VI, § 4lh j Ellison v. Lang Transportation Co., supra; Tuttle v. Crawford, 8 Cal. (2d) 126 [63 :P.
(2d) 1128]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., supra.]
[4] Any asserted misconduct on the part of plaintiffs'
counsel in implying that defendants' counsel was withholding photographs of the scene of the accident may not be said
to have been prejudicial. The trial judge admonished the jury
to disregard the statements. (Keenav. United Ra~'lroads, 197
Cal. 1481 163 [239 Pac. 1061]; House v. Pacific Greyhound
Lines, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 336, 342 [95 P~ (2d) 465] ; Gerberich v. Southern California Edison Co., 26 Cal. App.(2d) 471,
476 [79 P. (2d) 783].) [5] Nor did plaintiff Matthew Speck's
statement. on the witness stand that defendant Philip Sarver
had stated he was insured constitute prejudicial misconduct
under the facts of this case. Speck's statement was made inci"
dentally during testimony as to a conversation which oc~
curred between him and Sarver in which Sarver tended to
admit. fault. The statement was not made in response to any
question by counsel attempting· to injeM the fact of defen"
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dants' insurance into the case. The proper rule governing the
reference to insurance in the instant case is found in Packard
v. Moore, 9 Cal. (2d) 571,580 [71 P. (2d) 922], wherein this
court adopts the following statement from Hughs v. Quackenbush, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 349 [37 P. (2d) 99]: "While the
courts have condemned repeatedly attempts to bring before
the jury the fact that insurance exists, their condemnation
extends only to cases where there is an 'avowcd purpose and
successful attempt' to bring the fact beforE: the jury. It does
not extend to cases where the information comes'in, incidentally, in attempting to prove other facts, or where the record
does not show that the particular answer was sought or anticipated." (See, also, Hatfield v. Lcvy Brothers, 18 Cal. (2d)
798 [117 P. (2d) 841].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurring.
GIBSON, C. J. -- I concur for the reason thnt the rules IlB
to the nature of rebuttable presumptions upon which the foregoing opinion is b8,sed have been fixed by many decisions of
this court, and any modification of such rules should be effected by the Legislature, and not by overruling at this time
the cases establishing them.

,

!~ '
~

:

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent..
After properly instructing the jury that the defendants
ha.d the burden of proving the plaintiffs guilty of contributory negligence, the court proceeded to instruct them that
there was a presumption against the existence of facts it, was
defendant's burden to prove, and that this presumption coUld
be weighed as evidence of their non-existence. This instruction was prejudicial error, for it enabled the jury to tilt the
scales against the defendant by arbitrarily attributing more
weight to the presumption than to the evidence against it,
no matter how extensive or persuasive. Evidence is mar'
shalled to no avail against a presumption under such an instruction, for it is impossible to prove the non-existence of
the fact presumed when the jury is free to regard the presllmption as superior to any proof against it. So long as the
presumption is regarded as superior it iq inviolate, and the
most exhaustive proof cannot disturb its invulnerability. The
rule that rebuttable' presumptions may be weighed as evi-
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dence is so arbitrary, and its consequences so mischievous
that it becomes imperative to set forth to what lengths it has
departed from the function and purposes of such presumptions.
When one of the parties to a lawsuit has the burden of
proof upon a particular issue, he must establish the existence
of the necessary facts by preponderance of the evidence, persuade the jury that it is more probable that these facts exist
than that they do not. (Code Civ. Proc. §§2061 (5),1826,1981 j
Murphy v. Waterhouse, 113 Cal. 467 [45 Pac. 866, 54 'Am.
St. Rep. 365] jErgo v. Merced Falls etc. 00., 161 Cal. 334
[119 Pac. 101, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 79] j Treadwell v. Nickel,
194 Cal. 2·13 [228 Pac. 25].) In a civil suit the. burden of
proof is the maximum requirement that can be placed upon
a party who undertakes to prove the existence of facts. In
some instances the courts and legislatures have found it neces~
sary to lend assistance to the party bearing the burden of
proof. In certain types of C8.$es they have set up rules, designated &i rebuttable presumptions, to the effect that when such
a party establishes the existence of certain primary facts, the
additional facts necessary to prove his ease will be presumed
4~ to exist, unless the opposing party offers proof that they do
. not exist, in which case the jury must determine the existence
or non-exh;tence of these facts from the evidence. Rebuttable
presumptions do not shift the ultimate burden of proof, but
impose upon the party without the burden of proof the burden of going forward with the evidence after his opponent
has introduced evidence sufficient to establish the existence of
certain primary faets. (Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.] §§ 2487,
2489, 2491; Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence,
314-315, 317. Sue Scott v. Wood, 81 Cal. 398 [22 Pac. 871] ;
San Francisco v. Tillman Estate 00., 205 Cal. 651 [272. Pac.
585].) They are employed for various reasons (See Morgan,
Instrtwting the Jury on PreS1tmptions and Burden of Proof.
47 Harv. L. Rev. 59, 77; American Law Institute, Code of
Evidence Tentative Draft No.2, (1941) p. 211): (1) To require the litigant v:ith greater access to the factS in dispute
to make them ~own. Thus, if a plaintiff bailor, with the burden of proof, establishes that he delivered property in good
condition to a defendant bailee and received it back in a damaged condition, a presumption arises that it was damaged be-'
cause of the bailee's negligence, and the latter must then come
forward with proof that his negligence did not cause the in-
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when there is little or no evidence available to prove or disprove a particular fact. Thus, if a person has been continuously absent and unheard from for seven years, he will be presumed dead in the absence of evidence to the contrary, so as
to enable a court to distribute his estate. (Code Civ. Proc.
§1963(26).) (3) To facilitate a finding in accord with the
balance of probability. Thus, it is presumed in the absence of
evidence to the contrary that a person found to have met his
death by violence did not commit suicide. (Code Civ. Proc.
§ 1963(1); see Mar Shee v. Maryland Assur. Oorp., 190 Cal.
1 [210 Pac. 269] ; 95 A. L. R. 887.) (4) To encourage a finding consonant with judicial judgment as to sound social policy. Thus, it is usually presumed in the absence of evidence to
the contrary that a marriage has been lawfully contracted.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 1963 (30) .)
Rebuttable presumptions are thus no more than procedural
devices for the fair apportionment between the litigants of
the burden of going forward with the evidence. If the party
against whom a' presumption operates fails to come forward
with substantial evidence tending to prove the non-existence
of the facts presumed, his Opponent with the burden of proof
is entitled to an instruction that the facts exist. If he does
come forward with such evidence, the jury must decide upon
the existence of the facts. (Wigmore, supra, §§ 2487, 2489,
249i; Thayer, supra, 314-315, 317; 1 Jones, Evidence [2d ed.]
54.)
In the majority of jurisdictions the presumption disappears from the case when evidence is introduced contrary to
the facts presumed, and the issue goes to the jury with the
primary burden of proving the facts still upon the party who
originally assumed it. (See cases cited in 22 C. J. 156, note
34; Wigmore, supra, § 2491 ; Jones, S1tpra, § 32.) Some courts,
however, hold that a presumption continues to operate until
the party against whom it applies introduces evidence that
persuades the jury that the non-existence of the facts presumed is as probable as their existence when considered with
evidence as to their existence introduced by the litigant in
whose favor the presumption operates. (O'Dea v. Amodeo,
118 Conn. 58 [170Atl. 486J ; Beggs v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
00., 219 Iowa 24 [257 N. W. 445, 95 A. L. R. 863] ; Clark v.

-~~""~~
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jury. (Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. 00., 60
F. (2d) 734; Rustad v. G1'eatNorthern R. R. 00., 122 Minn.
453 [142 N. W. 727].) (2) To assist in solving a dilemma
,I·
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Diefendorf, 109 Conn. 507 [147 Atl. 33] ; Gillett v. Michigan
United Traction 00., 205 Mich. 410 [171 N. W. 536] ; Klunk
v. Hocking Valley Ry. 00., 74 Ohio St. 125 [77 N. E. 752].
See Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and
Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59; McBaine, Presumptions: Are They Evidence? 26 CaL L . Rev. 519, 533.) If the
opposing party introduces no substantial evidence to combat
the presumption, the court will instruct the jury that the
facts exist as a matter of law. If he introduces such evidence
the case goes to the jury with instructions that if it disbelieves the evidence of the opposing party, the presumption
stands and the verdict should be in favor of the party with
the burden of proof. If, however, the jury believes it dS probable that the facts do not exist as that they do, it should find
in favor of the party against whom the presumption operates.
This view of the effect of presumptions is the sounder one.
Under the majority rule the purpose of a presumption can be
defeated by perjured testimony that is not believed by the
trier of the facts; the mere introduction of evidence, however
unreliable, suffices to dispel the presumption. Under the minority rule the presumption remains until sufficient contrary
evidence is introduced that the trier of the facts is willing to
believe.
In either case, it is clear that a rebuttable presumption is
only a procedural device to aid the party with the burden of
proof. It would be meaningless if applied against him because
he already has the greater burden of introducing. sufficient
evidence to prove the existence of the facts by the preponderance of the probabilities. Such presumptions cannot constitute
actual evidence, as would the observations of witnesSe~ or
physical objects or occurrences. They are merely rules establishing the existence of a fact as a matter of law in the absence of credible evidence to the contrary, and apportioning
the burden of going forward with the introduction of such
evidence. The overwhelming majority. of decisions in other
jurisdictions agree that rebuttable presumptions' cannot be
evidence, however they may disagree as to when they disappear from the case. (See cases cited in 95 A. L. R. 880.)
Certain cases in California, however, have held that the
court should instruct the jury to weigh presumptions as .actual evidence along with the testimony in determining the
existence of facts, and that preijumptions may be directed
against the party with the burden of proof. (Smellie v. South-
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ern PaCific 00. et al., 212 Cal. 540 [299 Pac. 529] ; see cascs
cited in 18 Cal. L. Rev. 418; 20 Cal. L. Rev. 189. Sec 95
A. L. R. 883.) It is a mental impossibility to weigh a presumption as evidence. Juries can decide upon the probable
existence of a fact only by a consideration of actual probative evidence bearing thereon. A rule of law that the fact will
be presumed to exist in the absence of evidence cannot assist
them in determining from an examination of evidence
whether ornot the fact exists. It is impossible to weigh a rule
of law On the one hand against physical objects and personal
observations on the other to determine which would more
probably establish the existence or non-existence of a fact.
The burden of proof may well be impossible for a litigant
to sustain if a presumption is applied as evidence against him.
He must, under such a rule, establish the existence of certain
facts by a preponderance of the probabilities, while a presumption persists that these facts do not exist and the jury
is free to weigh this presumption as evidence upon which to
find that the facts do not exist despite physical evidence that
they do.
Even when a presumption treated as evidence is applied
in favor of the party with the burden of proof, the results are
incongruous. The other litigant is in effect informed by the
court that his opponent has the burden of proving the facts
by the preponderance of the probabilities but there is a presumption that the facts thus to be proved are true, and the
jury is free to find on the basis of·this presumption that the
facts do exist despite physical El'Vidence that they do not. The
presumption should serve only to force the party without the
burden of proof to come forward with evidence contrary to
the facts presumed, not somehow to outweigh the very evidence that he introduces to prove his point.
The California cases have treated presumptions as evidence
primarily on the ground that certain code sections compel
this result. (See McBaine, supra, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 519, 557561.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1961 states : "A presumption (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be
controverted by other evidence; direct or indirect; but .unless
so controverted the jury are bound to find according to the
presumption. " Section 1963 lists 40 rebuttable presumptions
that "may be controverted by other evidence." These sections
embody the general rule that a rebuttable presumption establishes the existence of a fact unless credible evidence contrary
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to the fact presumed is presented. They in no way establish
that the presumption itself is evidence. The references to
"othcr evidence" serves to distinguish evidence controverting the presumption from evidence of the primary facts that
give rise to the presumption and from evidence that may be
introduced in support of the f!lct presumed.
Section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The
jury, subject to the control of the court, in the cases specified in this code, are the judges of the effect or value of evidence addressed to them, except when it is declared to be
conclusive. They are, however, to be instructed by the court
on all proper occasions: ... (2) That they.are not bound to
decide in conformity with the declarations of any number of
witnesses, which do not produce conviction: in' their minds,
against a less number or against a presumption or other evidence satisfying their minds. " Certainly there is no statement
here that a presumption must be treated as evidence .. This
section does no more than establish the,rule that gives to presumptions greater vitality than they would ha\1e if they' disappeared upon the introduction of any evidence contrary to
thefacts'presumed. It provides in effect that a rebuttal:!le presumption remains in the case arid controls the determination
of a jury that disbelieves the evidEmce contrary to the fact
prestimed.
,Finally, section 1957 provides: "Indirect evidence is of
two kinds: 1. Inferences, and 2. Presumptions." This section
is a broad classification of indirect evidence and is not concerned with the legal effect of a presumption. At the timeQf
its adoption in 1872, legal writers used the termspresumptions and inferences interchangeably. to apply to a logical deduction that could be drawn from a set of facts. (1 'Greenleaf,
Evidence [Redfield ed.] 21; 1 Phillipps, Evidence, [3ded.]
436-437; 1 Starkie, Evidence, [3d ed.] 404. See Thayer, supra,
546-548; Wigmore, supra, § 2491; McBaine, supra, 26 Cal.
L. Rev. 519, 521-527.) That this meaning of presumption was
intended by the Legislature when it enacted section 1957 in
1872 is indicated by section 1832, enacted at the same time,
which states: "Indirect evidence is that which tends to establish the fact in dispute by proving another,and which, t,hough
true, does not of itself conclusively establish that fact, but
which affords an inference or presumption of its existence.
For example: a witness proves an admission of the party to
the fact in dispute. This proves a fact, from which the fact
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in dispute is inferred." This section defines indirect evidence
as an inference, but uses the terms "inference" and "presumption" as synonyms. Section 1957 does not therefore
establish rebuttable legal presumptions as evidence in view of
other sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which specifically set forth the effect of legal rebuttable presumptions.
(Code Civ.· Proc. §§ 1959, 1961, 1963.) A construction ofthese
sections to the effect that rebuttable presumptions may be
weighed as evidence would in all likelihood render them unconstitutional. (Manley v. State of Georgia, 279 U. S. 1 [49
S. Ct. 215, 73 L. Ed. 575] ; Western &- Atlantic R. R. 00. v.
Henderson, 279 U. S. 639[49 S. Ct. 445, 73 L. Ed. 884];
Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 [54 S. Ct. 281, 78 L. Ed.
664]; New York Life Insur. 00. v. Gamer, 303 U. S. 161 [58
R Ct. 500, 82 L. Ed. 726, 114 A. L. R. 1218]. See, also, People v. Murguia, 6 Cal. (2d) 190 [57 P. (2d) 115]. See McBaine, supra, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 519, 551 note 66 and authorities
there cited.)
The rebuttable presumptions enumerated in the codes as
well as those established by the courts do not require any set
procedural formula to give them effect. If the litigant against
whom a presumption operates has the burden of proof, an instruction by the court to the jury that such litigant must
establish the facts by a preponderance of the probabilities imposes upon the litigant an even greater burden than that required by the presumption. No mention of the presumption
is necessary. If the presumption operates in favor of the party
with the burden of proof the court should instruct the jury
that upon the setting up of certain preliminary facts the presumption applies in favor of the party with the burden of
proof who is entitled to the verdict unless the other litigant
comes forward with credible evidence contrary to the facts
presumed. Once such evidence is produced and believed, the
jury should weigh it against any evidence introduced in support of the facts presumed and decide in favor of the party
against whom the presumption operates if it believes that the
non-existence of the facts is as probable as their existence.
Nothing need be said about weighing the presumption as evidence. When the evidence against the presumption is clear,
positive, uncontradicted and of such a nature that it cannot
rationally be ~!:dieved the court should instruct the jury,
as 1± -;;(Juid regarding inferences, that the non-existence of
che fact presumed has been established as a matter of law.
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(Blank v. Ooffin, 20 Cal. (2d) 457 [126 P. (2d) 868); Engstrom v.Aub1trn Auto Sales Oorp., 11 Cal. (2d) 64 [77 P.
(2d) 1059).)
.
There is no agreement in the California cases on the propOsition that rebuttable presumptions should be weighed asevidence. The Smellie case, supra, was preceded by a,line of decisions holding that presumptions were not evidence. (Biddle
Boggs v. Merced Mining 00., 14 Cal. 279, 375; Nietov. Oarpenter, 21 Cal. 455, 489; Larrabee v. Western Pacific Ry. Co.,
173 Cal. 743, 747 [161 Pac. 750).) The courts have consistently held that the presumption of innocence from crime canhot be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding. (People v.
Moran, 144 Cal. 48 [77 Pac. 777).) The Smellie case held that
Code of Civil Procedure section 1963 (4), which presumes
"that a person takes ordinary care {If his own concerns"
should be weighed by the jury as evidence of absence of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. Later cases have
. limited the application of this presumption to situations
where there are no eye witnesses to. an accident, holding that
"where it is possible to call eye witnesses to testify positively.
to the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, the
.... presumption is not applicable." (Downing v. Southern Pacific 00., 15 Cal. App. (2d) 246 [59 P.(2d) 578]; Rogers v.
Tl1.terstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36 [297 Pac. 884].) Still
other cases have held that this presumption and similar ones
in favor of one party are dispelled when the details of the
accident are disclosed by the testimony of that pa.rty or his
witnesses. (Mar Shee v. Maryland Assur. Corp., 190 Cal. 1
[210 Pac. 2691 ; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal. (2d) 294 [65 P.
(2d) 65) ; Kelly v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 356 (65 P. (2d)
914] ; Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal. (2d) 111 (47 P. (2d) 709).)
Certain decisions have indicated that the person whose conduct is in question must be dead before the presumption can
operate in this manner. (Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal. (2d)
360 [94 P. (2d) 590).) In effect these cases hold that the presumption drops out of the case because there is evidence
bringing into question the fact presumed. There is in them an
inarticulated admission that the character of evidence is foreign to presumptions, and that however often it has artifidally been grafted on to them it can be shed with equal facility. Confusion is rife, however, because presumptions have
not been clearly divested of their artificial character. They
appear now as themselves and again in the guise of evidence.
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The court has sometimes seen through the disguise when the
injustices it would have concealed revealed themselves immediately and boldly. As often as not, however, the court has
failed to perceive the injustice through the disguise. It. is
time to have done with the confusion and inconsistency engendered Ly its vacillation between the acceptance alid the repudiation of presumptions as evidence.
It is pure ritualism that a precedent should gather as much
respect from a long life of inconsistency as it would from a
long life of certainty, and earn the right to survive merely
be~ause it has survived so long. One looks to preeeuent for
certainty, the substance of its vitality. If instead it offers
only confusion it loses its right to endure indefinitely. The
confusion in the California cases as to the function of rebuttable presumptions can be eliminated only by repudiating the
erroneous ,iew that such presumptions may be weighed as
evidence. Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, and the cases
following it should be overruled.
In the field of evidence and procedure everything is gained
and little lost by overruling an irrational :;>recedcnt. Nothing
. is taken away, as it might be in the substantive law of property and contracts, upon which one is entitleu to rely. Certainly the parties in an automobile accident cannot reasonably· contenu that they operated their vehicles in rclbnce on
the rule in the Smellie case. That rule was a judgc~mauc rule
and should be laid at rest where it originnteu. It would be
most inappropriate to shift the responsibility for its demise
to the Lceislature, for it involves not questions of policy, Lui
tecb.nical questions of procedure that arc peculiarly within
the provincc of the courts. If the court can view with equanimity a legislative repUdiation of the rule, its own adherenco
to tho rule springs no longer from a conviction of its rightness, but from a willing!less to endure its wrongn(>ss until
others less suited to the task take the initiative in its repuuhtion.
EUlllonds, J., ooncurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August 20,
19..1:2. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., vote-d for a rdlCarinrr.
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ELETHA R. DILLARD, Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation) et aI., Respondents.
[1] Pensions-Construction of Statutes.-Pension laws should be
liberally construed and applied to the end that the beneficent
policy thereby established may be accorded proper recognition.
[2] Police-Pensions-Contingencies Justifying Pension-Heart

Attaek.-The fact that a police officer had a previous heart
affiiction at the time of an injury received in the performanee
of his duty does not of itself defeat his dependents' rir,ht to
a pension if the injury precipitated his death by aggravating
the heart condition.

0;

[3] Id. - Mandamus - Evidence. - In a mandamus proceeding to
enforce a right to a pension, the evidenee establishellthe death
of It policeman from an injury received in the performance of
his duty where it disclosed .that he received an injury during
a stru~gle to retain a prisoner in custody, that he was sent home
while in no condition to operate an automobile, that he consumed liquor during the short iI\terval between the time he was
left at his car and the collision, and that, as testified, the drinking was the natural act of a dying man to bolster his waning
strenr,th. In such circumstance, it is immaterial whether the
automobile accident immediately causing death resulted from
intoxication or a heart attack.

[4] Death-Presumptions-Negligcnce ....,...The operator of an automobile killed in It eollision with a car parked at the curb is presumed free from negligence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1963,
subd.4.)
[5] Police-Pensions-Contingencies Justifying Pension-Death
En Route Homo.-The death of a p(lliee officer in an automobile
accident arose out of and in the course of his employment within
a charter pension provision where he beeame il: from a heart
attack as the direct effect of a struggle with a prisoner, where
before the expiration of his regular period of duty he was
directed by his superior to return home because of such illness,
such superior knowing' that his means of transport was by automobile, and where the accident occurred while he was en route
home.
[1] SeC' 20 Cal.. Jur. 997.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pensions, § 3; [2, 5] Police, § 24;
[3] Police, § 32; [4] Death, § 42.

